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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ARLENE NOLEN,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JUDY HAMAKER-MANN, Director,
Utah State Driver's License Division,

:

CaseNo.20050877-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Arlene Nolen filed a petition for judicial review of the informal adjudicative
proceeding that resulted in the suspension 6f her driver's license in the Second District
Court. R. 1-6. The district court's order denying her petition was filed on September 12,
2005. R. 27-32. Ms. Nolen filed her notice of appeal on September 20, 2005. R. 36.
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) (appeals from district court decisions on petitions for judicial
reviews of informal adjudicative proceedings).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. On appeal, petitioner relies upon her own testimony that was found to be not
credible by the district court. Nolen has failed to meet her burden of marshaling the facts
that support the district court's credibility finding. Due to the petitioner's failure, this
Court should accept the district court's findings on appeal.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue is
unique to the appeal and does not require the review of any decision of the district court.
2. The district court accepted Officer Parkin's testimony, over that of petitioner,
that Ms. Nolen was intentionally failing to provide an adequate sample for the
breathalyzer test. Given this factual finding, the district court correctly upheld the
agency's decision to suspend her driver's license.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised at the bench trial and was
the basis for the district court denying the petition. Tr. 45-47, 58-63.'
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's findings of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. Save Our Schs. v. Bd. of Educ. 2005 UT 55,1fl[8-9,
122 P.3d 611 ("The trial court's factual findings will not be considered clearly erroneous
unless they are 'not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.'"). The district
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The transcript of the bench trial was not paginated as part of the record.
Citations to the transcript are by the page of the transcript only.
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court's conclusions of law drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. Drake v. Indus.
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997) (normally district court's application of facts to
legal rule reviewed for correctness in absence of special circumstances that would
indicate a more deferential review standard should be applied).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
AH such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 5,2004, Arlene Nolen was arrested for Driving Under the Influence
(DU1). Tt. 3. Based upon an administrative finding that she refused to submit to a
chemical test after being requested and warned by the arresting officer, her driver's
license was suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (West 2004).2 R. 5.
Nolen petitioned for judicial review of this decision on December 22,2004. R. 1-5. A
bench trial was held on Nolen's petition on March 11,2005. R. 13-14,25-26; Tr. 1-64.
The district court upheld the administrative decision to revoke the petitioner's
driving privileges in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orderfiledon
September 12,2005. R. 27-32. Nolen's notice of appeal was filed on September 20,
2005. R. 36-37.

2

The current version of this statute is found at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (West
Supp. 2005).
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The parties stipulated to the fact that Officer Parkin had probable cause to arrest
Ms. Nolen for DUI. Tr. 2. They also stipulated to the facts concerning the necessary
notices and admonitions being given to Ms. Nolen of the effect of her refusal to submit to
a breathalyzer test. Tr. 1-3. The only issue remaining for trial was whether the petitioner
had refused to take the breathalyzer test. Tr. 1.
Officer Parkin testified that he instructed the petitioner about the breathalyzer test
and how to perform it. Tr. 3. He read her a warning that "[i]f you refuse the test or fail to
follow my instructions the test will not be given; however, I must warn you that your
driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months for a first refusal..." Tr. 6.

Ms. Nolen

verbally agreed to take the test. Tr. 7. The officer explained to the petitioner:
that I was going to have her again seal her lips around the end of a plastic
mouth piece. I told her that when I instructed her to blow that she was
required to blow for at least four to five seconds. I informed her to take a
deep breath. When she started to blow and she provided a sufficient
sample, she would hear a steady constant tone. I advised her again that she
needed to blow hard enough to maintain that steady constant tone for the
four to five seconds.
Tr. 7-8.
Officer Parkin testified that Nolen did not follow his instructions. At first she
seemed to be spitting into the machine instead of blowing into it. Tr. 8. Even after she
stopped spitting, she would stop blowing as soon as she got a constant tone instead of
maintaining the tone for four to five seconds. Id. The officer continued to re-instruct the

4

petitioner, but she did not follow his instructions. Tr. 8-9. The machine has an automatic
three minute period in which the sample is to be collected. "At the end of the three
minutes sufficient sample was not obtained and so the machine at that point in time
produced a readout for an insufficient sample . . . " Tr. 9.
At no time did Ms. Nolen inform Officer Parkin that she was having any difficulty
with performing the test or that she was physically incapable of providing a sample. Tr.
9, 20. The test requires a minimum of one liter of breath and, in Officer Parkin's
experience, it is not very difficult for an individual to perform this test. Tr. 20. Officer
Parkin testified that Ms. Nolen was not hyperventilating. She was not having a hard time
breathing. Tr. 21-22. Officer Parkin believed that she could not provide an adequate
sample because she was unwilling to do so. Tr. 22. That Ms. Nolen was unwilling to
perform the test as instructed.
Ms. Nolen testified that she was physically incapable of providing a sample. Tr.
39-41. She testified that, because of fear, she would suck in air as she was trying to
breath into the machine. Tr. 40. Officer Parkin's testimony contradicted that of Ms.
Nolen.
A. No, again, my observation was is that she would begin to blow.
She would blow hard enough or consistent enough to hear the tone. Once
she heard the tone then she would stop. She would continue to blow, again
blow hard enough to hear the tone and then would stop. It didn't appear to
me that she was trying to breath in during the test.
Q. Did it appear to you she was having trouble breathing at all during the
test?
5

A. No, it did not.
Q. Did it appear to you that she was really scared in her words, so scared
during this test?
A. No, it did not.
Tr. 42-43.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court found the testimony of Officer Parkin to be more credible than
that of Ms. Nolen. This factual finding has not been challenged on appeal. Petitioner has
not marshaled the evidence that supports the district court's finding. And yet the
petitioner asks this Court to reverse the district court based on this rejected testimony.
The legal issue raised by the petitioner should be decided based upon the factual findings
made by the district court, and not based on evidence that was found not to be credible.
The objective facts found by the district court support the legal conclusion that the
petitioner refused to perform the breathalyzer test. While she verbally agreed to take the
test, she then refused to follow the instructions and perform the test correctly. Her
conduct was correctly determined to amount to a refusal that justified the suspension of
her driver's license.

6

ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER ERRS BY RELYING UPON TESTIMONY THAT
WAS FOUND TO LACK CREDIBILITY BY THE DISTRICT
COURT WHERE THIS FINDING OF FACT HAS NOT BEEN
CHALLENGED ON APPEAL
In claiming that her conduct did not show that she intentionally refused to perform
the breathalyzer test, Ms. Nolen relies upon her testimony that she could not physically
perform the test because of fear and inability to adequately breathe. Brief of Appellant at
8-12. While this was her testimony (Tr. 39-41), it was found to lack credibility by the
district court. The district court believed the testimony of Officer Parkin over that of the
petitioner. R. 30; Tr. 62.
Petitioner has not challenged this factual finding by the district court. Ms. Nolen
has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this factual finding and cannot challenge
it on appeal. A party challenging the district court's factual findings has a duty to marshal
the evidence.
It is the Plaintiffs* responsibility to marshal the evidence to
demonstrate that the factual findings made by the trial court were erroneous.
Specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to "marshal all the
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact."
Save Our Schs. 2005 UT 55 at f 10 (citation omitted); see also Covey v. Covev. 2003 UT
App 380, Tf27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's findings of
fact, Almon 'must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding[s] and then
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demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.5") .
Instead of marshaling the evidence supporting the district court's credibility
finding, and demonstrating that the finding was not supported by sufficient evidence, Ms.
Nolen instead simply relies on her rejected testimony.
Because petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence that supports the factual
finding of the district court, that finding should be affirmed on appeal.
II. BY HER ACTIONS, THE PETITIONER REFUSED TO TAKE
THE BREATHALYZER TEST AND HER DRIVER'S LICENSE
WAS PROPERLY SUSPENDED
In determining whether or not a driver has refused to perform a chemical test as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (West 2004) the courts review the driver's
conduct objectively.
Obviously the arresting officer cannot know the subjective state of
mind of the person arrested and whether he in fact intended his response to
a request to take a blood test to be the equivalent of a refusal that would
result in license revocation. The test must be objective; otherwise the
whole statutory scheme could be subverted by one who equivocates or
remains silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take
the test. However, the behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged
objectively, that the driver intended to refuse to take the test.
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah 1979). It is not necessary that the refusal to
take the test be verbal. "It is sufficient if the behavior of the driver indicates his intention
to refuse." Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984). It "may be implied
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from the driver's conduct, words, and behavior." Lee v. Schwendiman. 722 P.2d 766,
767 (Utah 1986).
The facts, as found by the district court, support the legal conclusion that Ms.
Nolen refused to take the test. While she verbally agreed to take the test, her actions and
conduct demonstrated a refusal to perform the test. She spit into the machine instead of
breathing into it. R. 29, 30; Tr. 8. She failed to follow instructions as to how long to
blow into the machine, even though they were repeated several times. Tr. 7-9, 42. At no
time did she tell Officer Parkin that she was having physical difficulty in taking the test.
R. 29, 30; Tr. 9, 20. Objectively, it did not appear to Officer Parkin that Ms. Nolen was
having trouble breathing during the test. Tr. 42.
The district court accepted Officer Parkin's testimony as being more credible than
that of Ms. Nolen. R. 30. Ms. Nolen's coriduct, as found by the district court, clearly
showed her intent to refuse to take the test. The fact that she said she was willing to take
the test does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, to give the statements of a driver more
importance than her actual conduct would emasculate the statute.
Plaintiff, however, presses upon us the argument that under the law a
refusal must be an express, unequivocal refusal before a drivers license
may be revoked.
This interpretation of the statute would effectively emasculate it and
is without foundation in authority or logic. If this argument were accepted,
any person driving under the influence of alcohol could avoid having his
license revoked by temporizing, equivocating, or simply remaining silent, as
the facts of this case clearly illustrate.
Beckv. Cox. 597P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1979).
9

Petitioner's claim that her verbal agreement to take the test should weigh more
heavily than her objective actions, that showed she refused to take the test, would lead to
the same erroneous result. By simply agreeing to take the test, and then failing to perforrti
it properly, a driver could circumvent the statute. The district court correctly considered
the actions of the petitioner and found that they constituted a failure to take the test.
Nor is the fact that the petitioner asked to be allowed to try again, after the
machine had shut down, change the fact that she had refused to take the test. "There is no
merit to plaintiffs contention that his belated request to take the breathalyzer test cured
his earlier refusal." Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984). Ms. Nolen
was given the opportunity to perform the test. Her actions show that she chose not to do
so. The district court did not err when it determined that, based on its factual findings,
the petitioner had refused to perform the test. Its dismissal of this petition should
therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to affirm the dismissal of
this action.
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument
10

or a published opinion is necessary, though respondent desires to participate in oral
argument if such is held by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this /3

^ r .day of January, 2006
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this /^j>
2006:
GLEN W. NEELEY
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
863 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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day of January,

ADDENDUM "A"

MOTOR VEHICLES

§41-6-44.8

plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of
those sections or ordinances.
Laws 1983, c. 102, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 138, § 40; Laws 1990, c. 299, § 2; Laws 1991, c
147, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 34; Laws 1994, c. 180, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 47, § 1, eff
April 29, 1996, Laws 1996, c. 71, § 2, eff. July 1, 1996.
Cross References
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302.
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204

§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 . Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drugNumber of tests—Refusal—Warning, report—Hearing, revocation of license—Appeal—Person incapable of refusal—Results of test available—
Who may give test—Evidence
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have
given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath,
blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44,
53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, oi
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of
a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6
(b)(i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and
how many of them are administered.
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though the person does submit to
any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c)(i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids
may not select the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific
chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer,
and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under
578
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Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person
shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a reftisal to
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's license to
operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person do^s not
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace
officer be administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License
Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle. When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver
License Division, the peace officer shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from
the date of arrest; and
(iii) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the
Driver License Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner
specified by the Driver License Division, also serve as the temporary license
certificate.
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report,
within ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under
Subsection (2)(b), that the peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested
person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited
under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section
41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or
tests under Subsection (1).
(e)(i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's
intention to revoke the person's license under this section is entitled to a
hearing.
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten
calendar days after the day on which notice is provided.
(iii) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division,
the Driver License Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver
License Division under this Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to
operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest for a period of:
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
579
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(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previown
ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44,6!
53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous i$g
years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44.
(f)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(ii), if a hearing is requested by
the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in
the county in which the offense occurred.
(ii) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other couniv
if the Driver License Division and the person both agree,
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe thai k
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44*
41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test.
(h)(i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent?
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance
of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace offl*
cers.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from
the Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Sec
tion 78-46-28.
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused i©
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division shall
revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i)(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous
ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44 6,
53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten
years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege
is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court
decision following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that th£
revocation was improper.
(j)(i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver Licenim
Division under this section may seek judicial review.
580
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(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial.
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering
the person incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is
considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1),
and the test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested
or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to the person.
(5)(a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does
not apply to taking a urine , breath, or oral fluid specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized
under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a
sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe
is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which
the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising
from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard
medical practice.
(6)(a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a
physician of the person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to
the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace
officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a
peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered
at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 43; Laws 1983, c. 99, § 16; Laws 1987, c. 129, § 3; Laws 1987, c.
13Sf § 41; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 143; Laws 1987, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 8, §§ 3, 4; Laws
1988, c. 148, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 30, § 21; Laws 1992, c. 78, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 161,
§ 2; Laws 1993, c. 193, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 205, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 35; Laws
1994, c. 180, § 3; Laws 1996, c. 71, § 3, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 61, eff.
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